Should banks be diversified or focused? Does diversification indeed lead to enhanced performance and, therefore, greater safety for banks, as traditional portfolio and banking theory would suggest?
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Introduction
Should banks diversify their portfolios across different industries or even broader economic sectors and geographical regions, or should they focus on a few related fields? Does diversification indeed lead to enhanced performance and, therefore, greater safety for banks, as traditional portfolio and banking theory would suggest? In this paper, we try to shed some light on these questions by investigating empirically the situation of German banks.
The focus versus diversification issue is important in the context of banks as they are affected by several regulations that create incentives either to diversify or to focus their portfolios, ie the imposition of capital requirements tied to the risk of the banks' assets or asset investment restrictions.
Hence, policymakers should be especially interested to see whether or not banks benefit from diversification.
Experts on financial institutions generally argue that banks -which are typically highly leveragedshould diversify to reduce their risks of suffering a costly bank failure. In addition, several models of intermediation theory suggest that diversification makes it cheaper for institutions to achieve credibility in their role as screeners or monitors of borrowers (see, for example, Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) ). However, corporate finance theory suggests that firms should, if anything, focus in order to avoid value-reducing diversification effects due to agency problems as pointed out by Denis et al (1997) or in order to avoid inefficient allocation of resources due to internal power struggles between divisions as discussed by Rajan et al (2000) or in order to protect themselves from significant losses in the firm value associated with corporate diversification strategies as documented by Berger and Ofek (1995) . Since real-world cases can be found to support either view, the question arises as to the circumstances which call for one strategy or the other to be applied. Winton (1999) presents a theoretical framework to investigate the above issue. In his model, the incentives of a bank to monitor loans and a bank's risk of failure strongly affect a bank's decision on whether to diversify or not. Diversification benefits appear to be greatest for banks with moderate levels of downside risk and when the banks' monitoring incentives need strengthening. Specialised banks with low exposure to downside risk have only minor incentives to diversify since diversification might increase their probability of failure, which is considered to be low at present. For diversified banks with sufficiently high downside risk, diversification can actually increase the probability of default since a diversified bank is exposed to more sectors than a specialised one and a downturn in one sector is enough to make a bank fail. Furthermore, banks which expand into new economic sectors or geographical regions have less expertise and, therefore, a lower monitoring effectiveness in these areas, at least initially. Some papers also suggest that a bank entering a sector with several established banks faces increased adverse selection in its pool of borrowers (see, for example, Gehrig (1998) and Shaffer (1998) ). Seen in this light, diversification may prove to be unattractive, particularly when the bank's loans have either a low or high downside risk.
Although the issue of focus versus diversification has a long history in corporate finance literature, it has not been addressed thoroughly in an empirical context for financial institutions and banks. The existing literature focuses mainly on geographical diversification and US data, and also provides mixed results. Hughes et al (1996) and Berger and DeYoung (2001) , for example, use more aggregated measures of bank diversification to examine geographical diversification for US banks, while Caprio and Wilson (1997) consider cross-country evidence of a relationship between concentration and bank insolvency. In addition, Dahl and Logan (2003) and Buch at al (2004) suggest that international diversification offers benefits while, according to Klein and Saidenberg (1998) and Morgan and Samolyk (2003) , the geographical diversification of US banks is not necessarily associated with an increase in profitability. DeLong (2001) finds that geographically-focused bank mergers in the US result in superior performance, while Stiroh and Rumble (2003) and Stiroh (2004) show that a shift towards non-interest income does not offer large diversification benefits.
Therefore, there is clearly a need for more empirical evidence on the effects of diversification on banks' performance based on individual bank-level data from European countries. The leading study in this respect is probably the one by Acharya et al (2006) , which examines the impact of sectoral and industrial loan diversification on the performance of Italian banks. The results of this study are consistent with Winton's theory of a deterioration in the effectiveness of banks' monitoring activities at high levels of risk. In addition, Acharya et al find that both industrial and sectoral loan diversification reduces banks' returns while endogenously producing riskier loans for high-risk banks in their sample. This implies that a diversification of banks' assets is not guaranteed to result in a superior return performance and/or greater safety for Italian banks.
The question now arises as to whether the Italian results are valid for other European countries, too.
Our study attempts to fill this gap by studying the situation of the German banking industry. Based on a unique data set of Deutsche Bundesbank involving data on individual bank loan portfolios disaggregated at micro level for the period from 1996 to 2002, we assess the impact of sectoral, industrial and geographical diversification on banks' profitability by looking at three major aspects.
Firstly, we are interested in the average effect on banks' returns of banks' portfolio diversification across industries, sectors and regions. Secondly, we try to gain an insight into whether diversification is used as an instrument to induce shifts in banks' risk-return efficiency. Thirdly, we test how monitoring effectiveness on the part of low, medium and high-risk banks impacts on the relationship between banks' portfolio diversification and banks' returns. Here -in contrast to previous studies -we apply a Value at Risk approach to measure banks' risk and derive unexpected losses for each individual bank as, in our opinion, unexpected losses are better suited to capturing banks' riskiness than is the more common proxy of expected losses.
Our main findings are as follows. Firstly, we find that portfolio diversification across different sectors, industries and regions tends to have a negative effect on banks' profitability rather than to lead to improved returns. Larger benefits are associated with geographical focus, whereas benefits from industrial focus appear to be only moderate. Secondly, there is evidence that, instead of operating at a constant risk-return efficiency level, banks use diversification in order to change their risk-return profile. As banks with highly risky credit portfolios are not systematically more profitable than banks with low risk portfolios, it seems that, overall, banks are not risk-return efficient. Thirdly, the profitability benefits associated with diversification are strongly dependent on the banks' risk level. In addition, the type of focus plays a crucial role. While the effect of sectoral focus on return declines monotonously with increasing risk, there is mixed evidence to suggest either a monotonously decreasing or a U-shaped relationship for regional focus as well as a rather distinct indication of a Ushape with respect to industrial focus. Therefore, our results confirm, at least partly, Winton's theory that diversification benefits are greatest for moderate risk levels. Finally, our data shows that diversification significantly improves banks' profitability only in the case of moderate risk levels and industrial diversification.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we describe our data and in Section 3 we present the empirical results before reaching a conclusion in Section 4.
Data

Data sources
The main data source for our analysis originates in the database of the credit register for loans of 1.5 million euro (formerly 3 million Deutsche Mark) or more at the Deutsche Bundesbank 3 . German banks have to provide quarterly reports on all claims exceeding the threshold of 1.5 million euro. Bank 3 Since the data in the credit register have been primarily gathered for regulatory rather than research purposes, the credit register may overstate and even double-count exposures (Deutsche Bundesbank 1998a). Actual exposures of firms to banks are overstated since they include both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet positions. Some off-balance sheet exposures do not appear to be direct exposures to a firm but e.g. guarantees for this firm's loans from another bank. Therefore, the inclusion of off-balance sheet exposures, which in reality represent guarantees, leads to actual exposure being overstated.
Since in this study we have used only on-balance sheet positions this problem does not imply to our case. Actual exposures are double-counted in some rare cases, though, when partners of companies under civil law (Gesellschaft bürgerlichen Rechts, GBR) are jointly accountable for losses. In this case, the exposure of the GBR is reflected in the position of each partner with the same amount. Unfortunately, we cannot adjust the data for this double-counting, however, the error should be neglectable in size, as companies under civil law are typically small firms whose debt does not exceed the threshold of 1.5 million euro and hence is not included in the credit register. Our data sample covers not only banks but also their subsidiaries and includes 3,760 individual entities. However, as small banks usually grant only very few large loans, the loans reported to the credit register sometimes cover only a rather small fraction of the total credit volume outstanding according to the banks' balance sheets. This implies that it might be misleading to analyse the diversification structure of these small banks on the basis of the information from the credit register, as the breakdown of the total portfolio could differ significantly from that of one of the large loans.
Therefore, our study focuses only on those banks where the ratio of the reported balance-sheet loans from the credit register to the total amount of assets according to the balance sheet exceeds 50%. 8 We also exclude affiliates of German banks abroad, mortgage banks and special-purpose banks from our analysis. This reduces the number of eligible banks to 983.
Over the period 1996 to 2002 many bank mergers took place. To handle mergers, we separate the two pre-merger banks from the merged bank. At the end, we thus have three banks, which are treated independently. We repeat this procedure as often as a merger took place. Additionally, in order to avoid the double counting of banks in the year of the merger, we dropped target banks in the year of the acquisition. 4 For example, lease receivables, mortgage loans, publicly guaranteed loans, inter-bank loans (with a residual maturity of up to one year) are listed separately under on balance sheet activities. 5 The following items are deemed not to be credit exposures: shares in other enterprises irrespective of how they are shown in the balance sheet and securities in the trading portfolio (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998b) . 6 Off balance sheet items include derivatives (other than written option positions), guarantees assumed in respect of these and other off balance sheet transactions (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998b) . 7 The former Federal Banking Supervisory Authority, now BaFin (Bundesanstalt fürFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht), ie the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority. 8 For these banks, the average coverage rate is about 70%.
Measurement of different types of diversification
The data from the credit register provide considerable details about the industrial, broader sectoral and geographical breakdown of German bank claims. On an individual bank basis, the following information on the portfolio breakdown is available.
1. The disaggregated industrial sector breakdown includes (1) agricultural, forestry and fishing products, (2) energy products, (3) iron and non-iron material and ore, (4) ores and products based on non-metallic minerals, (5) chemicals, (6) metal products, apart from machinery and means of conveyance, (7) agricultural and industrial machinery, (8) office, EDP machinery and others, (9) electrical material, (10) transport, (11) food products, beverages and tobacco-based products, (12) textiles, leather, shoes and clothing products, (13) paper, publishing and printing products, (14) rubber and plastic products, (15) other industrial products, (16) To measure diversification (or, alternatively, focus), we use the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index. It is calculated as the sum of the squares of exposures as a fraction of total exposure under a given classification and is represented by the following formula
where n is the number of groups and X i measures exposure to industry, sector or region i. The smallest and largest possible values for the Herfindahl Index are given by 1/n ≤ H ≤ 1. Hence, lending is more concentrated the closer the Herfindahl Index is to one and is perfectly diversified if H equals 1/n.
In our case, we constructed three different kinds of Herfindahl Indices: an industrial (and household) sector Herfindahl Index (HI), a broad asset type (or sectoral) Herfindahl Index (HT) and a regional (or geographical) Herfindahl Index (HR).
Balance-sheet variables
We employed the following (annual) variables obtained from the balance sheet data for the banks in our sample in the period from 1996 to 2002.
Return measures "Operating Profit/Assets" serves as the principal measure of return. All of the results displayed are based on this measure. However, we also performed robustness checks using other measures, such as "Operating Profit/Equity". We found that, overall, the results are robust with respect to the return measures employed.
Risk measures
The simplest method of measuring risk would be to look at a balance sheet ratio such as "Doubtful and Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans", which could be interpreted as capturing the level of expected losses. However, we consider that risk is more accurately represented by unexpected losses, which is the reason why we focused on a Value at Risk (VaR) measure.
Value at Risk is the most widespread method of determining a bank's loan portfolio risk. The Value at Risk of bank i in period t, VaR it , is the maximum loss over a target horizon such that, with a prespecified probability p, the realised loss will be smaller. The unexpected loss can be determined from the distribution of the portfolio losses at the target horizon as the difference between the mean of the portfolio value and the value at the p-percentile. In our calculations, p is 99.9%. This is based on the observation that banks typically work with percentiles higher than 99.5%. Since the following estimations are fixed-effects panel models where the levels of the variables are differenced out, the exact level of p will not affect our results. The values for the VaR have to be taken from the distribution of the portfolio value. We estimated the portfolio's value distribution using a simplified version of CreditMetrics. 10 The basic assumptions of CreditMetrics are that the returns of a debtor's assets are normally distributed and that a default occurs when the returns of a debtor fall below a certain threshold. The default threshold is determined from the probability of default (PD).
As our data set does not comprise rating information for individual loans, we used the average insolvency rate of the industry associated with the loan in order to proxy the default probability for a loan and to calculate its return threshold. We further assumed that the correlation between the returns 10 J.P. Morgan (1997) of debtors can be approximated by the correlation between the industries' insolvency rates. 11 Using equal probabilities of default for each bank, however, may bias the results since, for example, focused banks may have more effective monitoring systems and, therefore, grant loans with lower PDs than diversified banks. Therefore, as no information on the risk of loans at an industry and individual bank level is available for German banks, we had to adjust the (observed) industry insolvency ratios by bank-specific factors. To do so, we defined the industry insolvency ratio multiplied by a scale parameter which is related to a bank's loan loss provisions as a bank-specific PD. 12 As a result, banks with large loan loss provisions (divided by the amount of total loans) are assigned higher PDs for loans to a specific industry than are banks with lower provisions. It should be noted that bank loans to all industries are adjusted using the same scale factor because, unfortunately, the data does not allow
for a more precise adjustment.
The current value of a bank's overall portfolio at the beginning of a period is given by the sum of the bank's individual exposures to each industry, which we took from the credit register as described above. We then simulated returns using a multivariate normal distribution with mean zero and the correlation matrix from the insolvency data. 13 Defaults occur when the simulated returns fall below the threshold given by the critical values derived from the industries' annual insolvency rates. The simulated value of the portfolio at the end of the period is equal to the value at the beginning of the period less 45% of the loans defaulting in the simulations, which means that we assume a loss given default (LGD) of 45% in line with the Basel II proposal (see Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (2004)). 14 We then repeated this exercise 50,000 times in order to obtain the simulated loss distribution of a single bank in a specific period. Using the loss distribution, we calculated the 11 The insolvency data used were those of the Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches Bundesamt). The industry codes of the insolvency data correspond to the industry codes of the credit register. The insolvency rate of a specific industry is calculated as the number of insolvencies divided by the total number of companies in the industry. The probability of default of a specific industry is then calculated as the average of the annual data from 1994 to 2002. The correlation between insolvencies of the industries is calculated using monthly data for the same period. 12 More precisely, the scale parameter for bank i is defined as Bohn et al (2005) .
13 Insolvency data are used as a proxy for asset correlations since the latter are not observable. As a result, VaR it might be negatively biased as asset correlations are usually higher than insolvency correlations. However, with the assumption that the differences between the correlations of assets and insolvency are constant over time, the bias will difference out in the fixedeffects estimation. 14 As mentioned above, the VaR level differences out in the fixed effects estimations, which means that the value of the LGD will not affect our results.
unexpected loss as the difference between the 99.9% quantile and the mean. Finally, the variable Risk it was calculated as
Risk it = Unexpected Loss it /Total Exposure it
In order to obtain a panel of observations for Risk it, we repeated the simulations for each bank and each period of our sample.
Control variables
Banks' returns might not only be dependent on the respective banks' diversification and risk; they are also likely to differ as a result of other criteria. In the estimation, we controlled for unobservable individual and time effects by using dummy variables. The bank-specific dummies check for all effects which do not change for individual banks over time. These effects include, for example, characteristics which differ between banking groups, such as regional constraints on the part of German savings or cooperative banks or different ownership structures. In addition to these fixed effects, we also monitored characteristics which may change over time.
Personnel it = Personnel Costs it / Assets it
Size it = Ln(Assets it ).
In line with Acharya et al (2006) we used the variable Personnel it to proxy cost efficiency. The rationale is that banks with different cost efficiency levels may transform the benefits from diversification in a different way. The variable Size it captures the possible effects of scale on return.
The banks' equity ratio is a common control variable in many empirical studies (Acharya et al (2006) , Demirgüc-Kunt/Huizinger (1998), Quagliariello (2004) , Barth et al (2002) ).
Equity it = Equity Capital it / Assets it
The amount of capital banks hold depends on the banks' risks and risk preferences. Accordingly, Equity it depends on Risk it and the Herfindahl Indices. We tried to avoid the emergence of bias from this dependency and thus estimated the influence of diversification on returns without controlling for equity. However, in order to compare our results with those from other studies (for example, Acharya et al (2006)), we report results which include Equity it , too. Note that the mean (median) bank's size in the sample is about 4.2 billion euro (0.9 billion euro). The average industrial and sectoral focus measures (HI and HT) are quite low, which suggests a significant degree of diversification in these areas. However, the average geographical focus HR is rather high, which captures the fact that most German banks primarily do business with domestic counter-parties. In addition, Table 1 presents the correlation matrix among the explanatory variables of the following estimations. As it illustrates, the three Herfindahl Indices are not highly correlated. This suggests that the effects of industrial, sectoral and regional diversification on the banks' return might be different.
Summary statistics
Empirical framework
Our aim is to assess the impact of diversification on banks' profitability in the case of German banks.
We address this question by looking at three aspects. First of all, we are interested in the average effect of diversification on return. Subsequently, we try to answer the question of whether the link between return and diversification is consistent with portfolio theory. Finally, we test how monitoring effectiveness affects the relationship between diversification and return.
Average impact of diversification
We investigated the average impact of diversification on banks' performance in a panel regression where we regressed return on the Hirschman-Herfindahl Indices. More precisely, we estimated the following equation. β capture the average impact of focus on bank performance, which means that they are not conditioned by the banks' risk levels.
We estimate (1) with several restrictions. The results are reported in Table 2 . 15 In all specifications, the coefficients for the Herfindahl Indices are positive; in most cases they are also highly significant. The results are remarkably stable for the estimations (1a) -(1d); however, they change when Equity it is added to the equation; see specification (1e). In specification (1e), the coefficients for the Herfindahl Indices are considerably lower in terms of both absolute magnitude and significance level; at the same time, Equity it is highly significant. Hence, the inclusion of Equity it reduces the impact of the Herfindahl Index on Return it . This is consistent with our assumption that Equity it is determined by banks' risk preferences and that the coefficients 1 β , 2 β and 3 β in (1e) thus no longer reflect the average impact of focus on Return it . Aside from this assumption, the results of all specifications confirm a positive impact of geographical focus at a 1% confidence level and a positive impact of sectoral focus at a level of at least 10%. Furthermore, with regard to the magnitude of the coefficients, all estimations reveal the same order with HR it having the highest and HI it having the lowest coefficient. Table 2 Two-way fixed effects estimation of Equation (1) T-values in brackets, *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Blanks indicate that the coefficient of the variable is restricted to zero.
The positive coefficients of the Herfindahl Indices can be interpreted as confirmation that (at least on average) the mean profits arising from focusing loan portfolios exceed the mean profits achievable through diversification. The greatest benefits seem to be attainable through geographical focus, 15 Due to lack of space the coefficients of the year dummies are not reported with the other estimation results.
whereas the benefits from industrial focus appear to be only moderate.
In the following subsections, we will analyse whether the results are consistent with portfolio theory and/or how the quality of monitoring influences the link between diversification and returns.
Consistency with portfolio theory
Portfolio theory describes the relationship between diversification, expected returns and risk in a liquid portfolio. In general, different portfolios display different levels of risk and expected return. Portfolio theory assumes that among all possible portfolios at a certain risk level investors will always select the one with the highest expected return, which is called risk-return efficient. The efficient portfolios for different risk levels constitute an efficient frontier, which displays a positive slope in a risk-return diagram. The positive slope implies that when moving on the efficient frontier there is a trade-off between risk and expected returns.
In our context portfolio theory implies that a bank can change the diversification of its credit portfolio either to reach the efficient frontier (and therefore increase risk-return efficiency) or to move along the efficient frontier. In order to test which policy is prevalent, we added the variable Risk it (measured as described above) to Equation (1). 
Here, the coefficients β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 capture the impact of a variation in focus on return conditioned by the banks' risk level. If all banks operated on the efficient frontier the conditional coefficients β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 should be zero because banks with the same risk level should realize the same return on average. In other words, the effects of diversification would be entirely captured by risk. Besides, β 4 should be positive due to the trade-off between risk and return. If, however, banks did not operate on the efficient frontier, β 1 , β 2 , and β 3 would be different from zero and/or β 4 would be zero or negative.
This would imply that banks could use a change in their degree of diversification in order to change their risk-return profile, i.e. reach the efficient frontier.
It should be noted that risk-return efficiency is linked to expected returns. Since expected returns are not observable we have to replace them by observed returns in (2). Deviations of expected returns from observed returns are captured by ε it , which is assumed to be Gaussian. Furthermore, following portfolio theory, Risk it is endogenous in HT it , HR it and HI it and exogenous to Return it . Therefore, (1) can be interpreted as the reduced form of (2). Since there is no evidence of a positive relationship between risk and return, it appears that banks have not chosen their degree of diversification to operate at a constant risk-return efficiency level. This is confirmed by the non-zero coefficients of the Herfindahl Indices. Banks with highly risky credit portfolios were not systematically more profitable than banks with low risk portfolios. Table 3 Two-way fixed effects estimation of Equation (2) T-values in brackets, *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Blanks indicate that the coefficient of the variable is restricted to zero.
To sum up, the positive Herfindahl Indices in Table 3 indicate that banks with a higher level of focus tend to be more profitable than diversified banks and, at the same time, banks with a higher risk level seem to be less profitable. Accordingly, instead of operating at a constant risk-return efficiency level, banks appear to have used diversification as an instrument to change their risk-return profiles.
However, note that these interpretations of (2) in the sense of risk-return efficiency only hold under the assumption that the deviations of observed returns from expected returns average out in the timewindow that we consider.
Diversification, monitoring effectiveness and returns
Finally, we analysed how monitoring effectiveness affects the link between diversification and banks'
returns. In Winton's (1999) model, effective loan monitoring is the force that prevents banks from failure by catching problem loans before the situation deteriorates too far. Therefore, the monitoring of loans allows banks to improve their loan returns and reduce their default probability. When deciding whether to diversify or not, banks take into account the impact of diversification on their incentives to monitor their loans and their probability of failure. Specialised banks which are exposed to sectors with low downside risk will derive only moderate benefits from diversification as they have a low default probability anyway. Alternatively, in the case of diversified banks with loans of sufficiently high downside risk, bank owners (equity holders or managers) have only few incentives to monitor as, on an expected basis, most of the benefits from monitoring will accrue only to the bank's creditors (uninsured depositors and providers of borrowed funds) and diversification could actually increase the banks' default probability. Accordingly, the benefits from diversification are greatest if banks' loans have moderate levels of downside risk and if banks' monitoring incentives need to be strengthened.
In terms of empirically testable hypotheses, Winton's theory implies that the relationship between return and focus (or, alternatively, diversification) should be expected to be non-linear and U-shaped in risk. To try to capture this, we first of all reproduced the tests proposed by Acharya et al. (2006) .
They expanded Equation (2) 
By calculating the first derivative of return on focus, it is easy to see that a U-shape in risk is given if α 11 < 0, α 12 > 0, α 21 < 0, α 22 > 0, α 31 < 0 and α 32 > 0, see Acharya et al. (2006) .
The estimated coefficients (see Table 4 ) are consistent with the patterns associated with a U-shaped form, the only exception being the specification which contains Equity it . In all other equations, the coefficients of the Herfindahl Indices interactant with RISK it are negative, whereas they are positive when interactant with RISK² it . Most of the coefficients are significant at a 5% or even at a 1% confidence level. Thus, the results could be interpreted as strong evidence of a U-shaped relationship between focus and return depending on the level of risk. T-values in brackets, *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Blanks indicate that the coefficient of the variable is restricted to zero.
However, to better understand the economic significance of this potential U-shaped relationship, Figure 1 plots the marginal effect d(return)/d(focus) for different values of risk for all three types of diversification based on the estimated coefficients from (3b), (3c) and (3d). The range of risk is taken to be between 0% and 50%, which represents the minimum and the maximum values over our entire sample period. It should be noted that the mean (median) risk is about 3.4% (2.6%), while the 90th percentile is about 9%.
As can be seen in Figure 1 , in our sample a small increase in industrial focus (HI it ) has a rather minor and positive effect on return in the case of the mean (median) bank. For risk levels above 10%, the effect becomes slightly negative, but returns to a positive and sharply rising curve at a risk level of about 22% (corresponding to the 99th percentile of risk). Hence, we conclude that, within the range of risk levels observed in our sample, the marginal effect of industrial focus on return might indeed be Ushaped. Figure 1 The marginal effect of focus on return for different risk values for HT, HR and HI based on the estimated coefficients from (3b), (3c) and (3d) However, the result of the graph analysis is different for sectoral and geographical focus (HT it and HR it ). Here, an increase in focus also leads to rising returns for banks with risk levels below 12% and 27% respectively, but then the effect of focus stays negative and decreases for all of the risk levels observed. In fact, the effect becomes positive again only at hypothetical risk levels as high as 110%
and 160%. Therefore, we suspect that the true impact of sectoral and geographical focus on return might be a linear or, at least, monotonous decrease with risk rather than a U-shaped relationship.
To further explore this issue, we have to overcome the drawback of the above test, ie the restrictions imposed by the parameterisation of the non-linearities between diversification, risk and return in (3).
Richer patterns of non-linearity can be detected with non-parametric methods. To this end, we follow the example of Acharya et al. (2006) and define a set of dummy variables which measure different risk levels. The dummy variables are defined as follows: [25] and zero otherwise, [50] and zero otherwise, [75] and zero otherwise, [90] and zero otherwise, [90] and zero otherwise,
where Risk [p] is the p th percentile of Risk it . We then interact the dummies with the Herfindahl Indices and regress the resulting variables on risk. Hence, our model has the following form: 
The estimation results are shown in Table 5 . Table 5 Two-way fixed effects estimation of Equation (1) T-values in brackets, *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. Blanks indicate that the coefficient of the variable is restricted to zero.
It should be noted that the coefficients of the Herfindahl Indices which are not interactant with the dummy variables capture the impact of focus on return for the group of banks with the lowest risk level. Therefore, banks with the lowest risk level represent our benchmark group and other coefficients has to be interpreted as a deviation from this benchmark group. The coefficients of the Herfindahl Indices which are not interactant are generally positive (again the only exception being the equation which includes equity) and highly significant. In the specifications where the Herfindahl Indices are analysed separately, the coefficients of sectoral and geographical focus are significantly negative when interactant with the dummies. At the same time, they exhibit a slight decrease in magnitude with rising risk (see (4b) and (4c)). This pattern confirms the hypothesis that the benefits from focus are greater for low-risk banks than for banks with higher levels of risk.
Furthermore, similar to the parametric analysis above, the overall influence of sectoral and geographical focus on return stays positive for all levels of risk as the absolute magnitude of the (negative) coefficients of the terms interactant with the risk dummies is lower than the (positive) (4d)). Additionally, a U-shaped relationship with return can be detected since the overall impact of industrial focus increases to slightly positive (though insignificant) levels for the banks with the greatest risk.
Although these patterns are less pronounced for the estimations (4a) and (4e), in all cases the coefficients reveal evidence of a non-linear relationship between diversification and risk, with a strong positive impact of Herfindahl Indices in the case of low-risk banks and a moderate or insignificant impact for higher-risk banks. The less pronounced results for sectoral and geographical diversification in specification (4a) as compared with (4b) and (4c) may be attributed to the lower degree of freedom in the estimation.
To sum up, the dummy variable approach provides strong evidence that the impact of a bank's portfolio diversification on its return depends on the bank's risk level. Industrial, sectoral and geographical focus yields the highest benefits when risk is low. The benefits from focus decrease and, hence, the benefits from diversification increase with rising risk levels. For industrial focus, the impact becomes insignificant for high risk levels. The findings in Tables 2 and 3, namely that industrial focus, on average, has a smaller impact on returns than does sectoral and geographical focus, can be attributed mostly to banks with moderate risk.
However, it is still difficult to test the hypothesis of a U-shaped form, since the classes which define the dummy variables are fixed heuristically and may be too rough to detect the underlying structure of the relationship between diversification, risk and return. In order to gain a more precise picture of the shape of the non-linearities, we performed a second non-parametric procedure. We classified the data set according to risk level. We then estimated (1) β decreases and becomes slightly (and insignificantly) negative. Therefore, as with the former approaches, the effect of sectoral focus on return seems to monotonously decrease with risk. On the other hand, the coefficient of regional focus (HR it ) now shows -in contrast to former resultsa U-shaped form. It is highly positive for low risk levels, decreases for moderate risk levels (although it remains positive) and then rises again for high-risk banks. Finally, industrial focus (HI it ) has a positive coefficient only at low risk levels. For moderate risk levels, it is slightly but significantly negative, while the coefficient becomes insignificantly negative for the highest risk. As such, the rolling window approach provides less distinct evidence of a U-shaped relationship between industrial focus and banks' returns than do the above results.
To sum up, in order to assess the impact of banks' portfolio diversification or focus on their returns at different risk levels, we applied and compared three different approaches. We first of all introduced non-linear terms in the base specification and then applied two non-parametric tests by interacting the Herfindahl Indices with dummies for different risk levels and using a rolling window approach for each type of diversification. Table 6 goes some way towards summarising the different results. Table 6 clearly demonstrates that the benefits from industrial, sectoral and geographical diversification systematically and noticeably vary according to banks' risk levels. Therefore, banks' decisions on whether or not to diversify their loan portfolio should be closely linked to their current risk level.
Moreover, the type of focus plays a crucial role. According to all three approaches, sectoral focus, for example, is moderately beneficial for low-risk banks, while its influence on return decreases monotonously for higher risk levels. This effect either stays positive for all banks or becomes only (insignificantly) negative for rather high risk levels. In the case of geographical focus, however, all of the results indicate a positive effect on return for all risk profiles. However, while the parametric and dummy variables approaches reveal a monotonous decline in this positive relationship for higher-risk banks, the rolling window approach clearly depicts a U-shaped form. Furthermore, for industrial focus, we found evidence of a U-shaped link to return, as the results show a positive influence for low risk, a significantly negative impact for moderate risk and almost no effect for very high-risk banks. Hence, our analyses at least partly confirm Winton's theory that the diversification benefits are greatest at moderate risk levels. -10 th perc.
-25 th perc.
-50 th perc.
-75 th perc.
-90 th perc.
-99 th perc.
-100 th perc. Sectoral focus (HT it ) Parametric approach (see Table 4 , 4b) that a firm should focus so as to obtain the greatest possible benefit from management's expertise and to reduce agency problems (see Jensen (1986) , Denis et al. (1997) and Rajan et al. (2000) ). Our results clearly support the latter theory, as the evidence we present indicates that each kind of diversification tends to lower German banks' returns, ie focusing generally leads to greater profitability benefits.
However, the impact of all types of diversification on banks' returns changes according to the risk level. While the effect of sectoral focus on return declines monotonously with increasing risk, there is mixed evidence to suggest either a monotonously decreasing or a U-shaped relationship for regional focus as well as a rather distinct indication of a U-shape with respect to industrial focus. Therefore, our results at least partly confirm Winton's theory regarding poor monitoring incentives for high-risk banks, which -in terms of empirically testable hypotheses -implies that the relationship between return and focus should be non-linear and U-shaped in risk.
Furthermore, in our data, diversification improves banks' profitability only in the case of moderate risk levels and industrial diversification. Hence, from a policy point of view, regarding the decision on whether to increase the degree of their industrial, sectoral or geographical diversification banks should evaluate carefully the actual riskiness of their activities.
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